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Abstract
The traditional bottleneck model for road congestion promotes the implement-
ation of a triangular, fully time varying, charge as the optimal solution for the
road congestion externality. However, cognitive and technological barriers put
a practical limit to the degree of differentiation real world implementations can
handle. The traditional approach to accommodate for this concern has been a step
toll, with the single step coarse charge as its simplest case.
In this paper we study how efficiency of the coarse charge can be improved
by differentiating its level and timing across groups of travellers. We use the
traditional bottleneck model to analyse how the coarse charge can be differentiated
over two groups of travellers assuming inelastic peak-hour demand.
The results of our analysis indicate that differentiating the coarse charge across
two groups of travellers considerably improves its efficiency without increasing
cognitive effort and decision making costs for the individual traveller. A numeric
illustration reveals a welfare gain of 69% of the first best charge, up from 53% for
the generic coarse charge. This increase is similar to what is obtained by moving
from the coarse charge to a generic two step toll. Once different groups have been
defined, one could in fact achieve the same gains by temporal separation of drivers,
for example by use of licence plate numbers.
The presented charging regime has a considerable degree of flexibility with
respect to share of travellers to attribute to each scheme, which further adds to its
merits in practical applicability.
1 Introduction
The bottleneck model first introduced by Vickrey (1969) has been recognised as the
reference representation of peak hour road congestion. A structural definition of the
model is provided by Arnott, Palma and Lindsey (1993) who illustrate its application
for the assessment of a number of charging schemes. While the first best charge directly
derives from the model definition, analysis of alternative schemes becomes quickly
complicated as noted by Arnott, Palma and Lindsey (1990).
Subsequent literature on bottleneck charging focused on a number of extensions,
including heterogeneous travellers, interaction between parallel or serial bottlenecks,
the presence of untaxed alternatives and so on. An overview is provided by Arnott,
Palma and Lindsey (1998); Lindsey and Verhoef (2001).
While the existing analyses of bottleneck charging are generally illuminating,
barriers have been identified in implementing it straightforwardly. As noted by Arnott
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et al. (1990), the implementation of a first best time varying charge is technically
demanding. The fully variable characteristic of the charge probably also requires a
considerable cognitive effort by the traveller. It is to be expected that effectiveness
of charging reaches a limit or even decreases when search and decision costs become
prohibitive as a result of too much differentiation (see for instance Norwood, 2006).
In order to meet concerns about feasibility, Arnott et al. (1990) present an optimal
coarse charge which yields about half of the efficiency of the first best scheme (Arnott
et al., 1993).
In this paper we present an approach that allows for an improved efficiency of
bottleneck congestion charging by allowing for differentiation across groups of travel-
lers rather than along behavioural dimensions. We show how social efficiency of the
charging regime improves considerably without increasing cognitive efforts for the
individual traveller.
In a first section we introduce the bottleneck model. Subsequently we discuss the
first best charging scheme as well as the optimal coarse charging regime. In a next
section we introduce a regime that differentiates the coarse scheme over two groups of
travellers and study the merits of such a scheme. In a final section we conclude.
2 The Bottleneck model
In this section we provide a summary introduction to Vickrey’s bottleneck model and
discuss the no-toll equilibrium. We mainly draw from Arnott et al. (1990, 1998), we
refer to the original source for the full story.
The bottleneck model is a stylised representation of traffic congestion. It assumes a
group of N identical car drivers who want to arrive at their destination at time t∗. The
travellers follow a single road which has a bottleneck with a fixed flow capacity s and
which is otherwise uncongested. Without loss of generality for a single bottleneck, it is
assumed that the drivers arrive at the bottleneck immediately after departure from their
origin, and arrive at their destination immediately after leaving the bottleneck. Hence
travel time is limited to waiting time (queueing time) at the bottleneck.
The limited bottleneck capacity makes it impossible for all N travellers to arrive at
destination at the same desired time t∗. Those who arrive early or late face a schedule
delay cost.
Generalised travel costs C of an individual are determined by queueing costs and
schedule delay:1
C = α(travel time)+β (time early)+ γ(time late) (1)
with α , β and γ the shadow cost of time spent waiting in the queue, schedule delay
early and schedule delay late. We assume in this paper that 0 < β < α < γ (Small,
1982). The inequality β < α is required to avoid a mass departure in the equilibrium;
α < γ is not required for any such reason.
The (generalised) trip price p(t) for an individual arriving at time t equals travel
cost C(t) plus any charge ρ(t):
p(t) =C(t)+ρ(t) (2)
1The generalised travel cost is the sum of all monetary and non-monetary costs. In the context of the
bottleneck model used here it is limited to the relevant components which are waiting time costs and schedule
delay costs. Other costs components like fuel costs are constant over the peak hour and not relevant for our
discussion, so we leave them out for simplicity.
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For an equilibrium between travellers to be achieved it is required that the general-
ised trip cost p(t) is uniform over the peak period and higher outside this period. As
schedule delay costs cannot be equal for all travellers, a variation in waiting time must
compensate to allow for a user equilibrium in the absence of a charge (ρ(t) = 0 implies
p(t) =C(t)). In order to satisfy this condition, a queue builds up behind a bottleneck
matching the evolution in schedule delay costs (see figure 1).
In the equilibrium the first and the last traveller arriving at the bottleneck face no
queue but incur the highest schedule delay costs. After the first traveller arrives, a
queue starts to build up corresponding to a constant departure rate sα/(α −β ) that
exceeds the bottleneck capacity s.
The traveller arriving at destination exactly on time t∗ faces the longest waiting
time but no scheduling costs. After the departure of this traveller, the departure rate
drops to a level sα/(α+ γ) which is smaller than the bottleneck capacity s. As a result
the queue length and waiting costs diminish until the last traveller departs and arrives.
Social congestion costs in the bottleneck model are equal to total travel costs TC
and can be expressed as:
TC = NCN = δ
N2
s
(3)
with δ = βγ/(β + γ).2
Figure 1 indicates that half of the total travel costs TC are made up of waiting costs
whereas the other half are schedule delay costs.
Social costs of peak hour travel in the bottleneck model are independent of travel
time value α . The value of α only affects the length of the queue but not the actual
waiting costs in the equilibrium, because delay α evolves such that it compensates for
2This can be verified by noting that the first (last) driver incurs a schedule delay early (late) of
(N/s)γ/(β + γ) ((N/s)β/(β + γ)). Multiplying by β (γ) gives the cost (N/s)δ . The cost is equal for
all drivers in equilibrium, hence the expression for TC.
N
s
schedule delay cost
travel time cost (queueing)
β
γ
t∗
pN =CN
t
p
Figure 1: Generalised user cost as a function of arrival time t in the uncharged bottleneck
model (the bold line indicates generalised user price p(t) and the shaded area represents social
congestion costs TC)
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changes in schedule delay cost over time.
3 Different charging regimes
The literature describes the optimisation of a number of charging schemes of which we
will present the first-best and the coarse charge for the case of inelastic trip demand N.
The discussion here mainly draws from Arnott et al. (1990, 1998).
The first best charge corresponds to the situation where a time varying charge ρ(t)
replaces queueing time costs (see figure 2). In the equilibrium the individual traveller
is faced with the same generalised price pN as in the uncharged case; as a result the
user equilibrium does not change. But through adjusting the departure rate at origin
to match the bottleneck capacity s, the queue before the bottleneck disappears, which
corresponds to a net welfare gain. Note that the arrival rate is unchanged compared to
the uncharged regime, and remains equal to s.
The net welfare gain of the charge ρ(t) corresponds to the reduction in total social
costs TC compared to the uncharged scenario.3 As can be easy derived by comparing
figure 2 to 1, the welfare gain amounts to half the social cost of the peak travel. The
other half are scheduling costs, which cannot be abated.
The first-best charging scheme requires a continuously varying charge, which poses
some difficulties in application under real world circumstances. To address this concern,
a second-best coarse charge has been presented by Arnott et al. (1990). The coarse
charge is a fixed charge, levied over a limited time period. Arriving outside this period
(before or after) is left uncharged.
The optimal coarse charge is turned on before t∗ and turned off after t∗. The level
ρ and timing of the charge are chosen such that (in the user equilibrium) the length of
the queue is zero at the moment the charged period starts and just before the charged
period ends, but at no other time during the peak hour (see figure 3).
Under the coarse charge three groups of travellers can be distinguished. A first
group of NE travellers passes through the bottleneck before the charge is turned on.
3Monetary transactions related to the charge are considered not to be a net welfare cost. This can be
realised using a lump-sum transfer.
N
s
ρ(t)
C(t)
t∗
pN
t
p
Figure 2: Generalised user cost and charge as a function of arrival time t under the first-
best bottleneck charge (the bold line indicates generalised user price p(t) and the shaded area
represents social congestion costs TC)
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s
NM
s
NL
s
ρ
t∗
CM
CE =CL
t
p
Figure 3: Generalised user cost and charge as a function of arrival time t under the coarse
bottleneck charge (the bold line indicates generalised user price p(t) and the shaded area
represents social congestion costs TC)
After the first traveller enters the bottleneck a queue builds up corresponding to a
constant departure rate sα/(α−β ) exceeding the bottleneck capacity s. After the last
traveller of NE departs, there are no departures until the charge is turned on. In the
equilibrium the travellers of group NE face a uniform generalised travel price pE :
pE =CE =CM +β
NE
s
(4)
After the queue length is reduced back again to zero, the charge ρ is turned on.
A second group of travellers NM passes through the bottleneck during the charged
period. After the first traveller of NM enters the bottleneck, a queue starts to build up
as a result of a constant departure rate sα/(α−β ) exceeding the bottleneck capacity
s. The queue reaches maximum length at the departure time of the traveller arriving
at destination at t∗. After this traveller departs the constant departure rate drops to a
level sα/(α+γ). The queue shortens correspondingly to reach zero length again when
the last traveller of NM travels through the bottleneck. Travellers of group NM incur
uniform generalised travel costs that correspond to uncharged bottleneck congestion
with uniform travel time and schedule delay cost CM plus a uniform charge ρ:
pM =CM +ρ = δ
NM
s
+ρ (5)
Immediately after the charge is lifted, all travellers of the last group NL depart
concurrently, and pass through the bottleneck in random order. This mass departure
is needed in equilibrium to make the expected cost for a traveller in this group equal
to that of the last tolled traveller, who faces a positive toll and a zero travel delay. In
figure 3 we represent the expected travel costs CL, equal to the expected price pL, for
each of these travellers with dashed lines:
pL =CL =CM +
α+ γ
2
NL
s
(6)
Note that the first traveller in group L faces a lower realisation of cost than pL, and
the last one a higher realisation. It is the randomness in passage times that equates the
expected costs across individuals.
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The user equilibrium across the different groups requires that pE = pL = pM . From
this condition and the expressions for generalised travel prices pE (4) and pL (6) follows
the size of the groups NE , NL and ultimately NM as a function of ρ .
Optimising total social costs TC delivers us the optimal coarse charge level ρ:4
TC = NECE +NMCM +NLCL (7)
dTC
dρ
= 0⇒ ρ = δ
2
N
s
(8)
The timing of the charge follows from the definition of the scheme and the group
sizes.
Note that for the second best coarse charge it is sufficient that the charging scheme
applies to drivers traveling outside the charging period. It is a bit paradoxical that
the NM drivers travelling during the charging period can be exempt from the charging
scheme without affecting the equilibrium.
Ultimately, the coarse charge user equilibrium could even be reproduced without
any charging scheme by barring a dedicated group of NE +NL drivers from travelling
during the charging period and allowing the remainder of the drivers (NM) to travel in
that period without paying any charge.5
One could imagine an alternating scheme where drivers are attributed to one of
both groups on a day-by-day basis to implement such a scheme. Licence plate numbers
could be used for assigning individuals to groups, and would in fact allow for refinement
over more classes than just two. When the time intervals thus assigned to the different
groups alternate over working days, all users would in the longer run benefit from such
policies, at least when demand is perfectly inelastic, so that a strict Pareto improvement
is achieved.
By defining separate groups, tolls are no longer needed to keep drivers out of
the central time intervals, while the efficiency gains are identical to those achieved
by step tolls designed for the same number of intervals. This fact, combined with
the presumably higher acceptability of the policy because of the absence of pricing,
may make it an attractive possibility for congestion management in practice. Shen
and Zhang (in press) make similar observations for temporal separation of travellers
through the use of ramp-metering for highways with multiple on-ramps.
4 The differentiated coarse charge
In this section we propose a scheme for a coarse charge which is differentiated over
two groups of travellers. We elaborate on the case where 0 < β < α < γ as in the
regimes discussed in the previous sections. We optimise our scheme with respect to
level and timing of the charges and share of the travellers attributed to each scheme.
We will initiate the discussion under a setting where travellers are exogenously
attributed to one of the two groups. Subsequently we will study what happens if the
group choice is endogenous.
The scheme we present is inspired by the optimal coarse charge discussed in the
previous section. A first group of travellers N1 is confronted with a coarse charge ρ1
4A full derivation is given in Arnott et al. (1990).
5It turns out that a comparable result was derived simultaneously, independent of ours, by Fosgerau
(2010), in the context of a bottleneck with parallel queues and a different formulation of schedule delay
costs.
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and a second group with a coarse charge ρ2. For the discussion here we arbitrarily
choose ρ2 > ρ1.
The first group of travellers N1 faces the generalised price evolution illustrated in
figure 4. Before the charge ρ1 is levied a group of travellers N1E pass through the
bottleneck from ts1E onwards. The first traveller of N1E faces no waiting costs but only
schedule delay. After the first traveller travels through the bottleneck, a queue builds
up corresponding to a constant departure rate sα/(α−β ) exceeding the bottleneck
capacity s. After the last traveller of N1E departs, the departure rate drops to zero until
this traveller arrives at destination at te1E , and the queue length is reduced back to zero
just before the charge ρ1 is turned on. The first traveller paying the toll will have a zero
travel delay and a cost CM . The first traveller at ts1E has also a zero travel delay and an
additional schedule delay cost βN1E/s. The generalised travel price p1E is then equal
to the uniform sum of waiting and scheduling costs C1E :
p1E =C1E =C1M +β
N1E
s
(9)
After the charge ρ1 is turned on, another group of travellers N1M passes through
the bottleneck (together with travellers of group N2M , see below), with the first and the
last traveller facing no queue and the traveller arriving at t∗ facing the highest queueing
cost but no schedule delay penalty. Travellers of group N1M incur uniform generalised
travel costs C1M(=C2M) that correspond to uncharged bottleneck congestion for a peak
with N1M +N2M travellers, plus a uniform charge ρ1:
p1M =C1M +ρ1 = δ
N1M +N2M
s
+ρ1 (10)
Immediately after the charge ρ1 is turned off, there is a mass departure of N1L
travellers who travel through the bottleneck in random order. The expected (or average)
generalised price p1L for this group is:
p1L =C1L =C1M +
α+ γ
2
N1L
s
(11)
The dynamic user equilibrium between the subgroups of N1 requires a uniform
generalised trip price: p1E = p1M = p1L. From this condition and the expressions for
N2E
s
N1E
s
N1M+N2M
s
N1L
s
N2L
s
ρ1
ts1E t
e
1E t
∗
C1M =C2M
C1E =C1L
C2E =C2L
t
p
Figure 4: Generalised user cost and charge ρ1 as a function of arrival time t under the differenti-
ated coarse bottleneck charge (the bold line indicates generalised user price p(t) of group N1
and the shaded area represents total social congestion costs TC)
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generalised trip cost p1E (9) and p1L (11) follows the size of the groups as a function
of ρ1:
p1E = p1M ⇒ N1E = ρ1sβ (12)
p1L = p1M ⇒ N1L = 2ρ1sα+ γ (13)
The second group of travellers N2 face a charge ρ2 that is levied during the entire
period over which travellers of the first group travel. The generalised travel price for
this group is presented in figure 5. As the charge ρ2 is larger than ρ1, no travellers of
the second group travel together with travellers of N1E and N1L.
A first batch of travellers N2E passes through the bottleneck before N1E . The first
traveller of N2E faces no waiting costs but only schedule delay. After the first traveller
travels through the bottleneck, a queue builds up corresponding to a constant departure
rate sα/(α−β ) exceeding the bottleneck capacity s. After the last traveller of N2E
departs, the departure rate drops to zero until this traveller arrives at destination and
queue length is reduced back to zero just before the charge ρ2 is turned on (after which
travellers of N1E start using the bottleneck). The generalised travel price p2E is equal
to the uniform sum of waiting and scheduling costs C2E :
p2E =C2E =C2M +β
N1E +N2E
s
(14)
In the middle of the peak a batch N2M passes through the bottleneck over the same
time period as (and together with) N1M . They face generalised travel costs C2M =C1M
plus the charge ρ2:
p2M =C2M +ρ2 = δ
N1M +N2M
s
+ρ2 (15)
After the last traveller of N1L arrives, the charge ρ2 is turned off and immediately
a mass of N2L travellers depart. This group travels through the bottleneck in random
order. The expected generalised price p2L for this group is:
p2L =C2L =C2M + γ
N1L
s
+
α+ γ
2
N2L
s
(16)
N2E
s
N1E
s
N1M+N2M
s
N1L
s
N2L
s
ρ2
ρ2
t∗
C1M =C2M
C1E =C1L
C2E =C2L
t
p
Figure 5: Generalised user cost and charge ρ2 as a function of arrival time t under the differenti-
ated coarse bottleneck charge (the bold line indicates generalised user price p(t) of group N2
and the shaded area represents total social congestion costs TC)
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The dynamic user equilibrium between the subgroups of N2 requires that p2E =
p2M = p2L. From this condition and the expressions for generalised travel prices p2E
(14) and p2L (16) follows the size of the groups N2E and N2L as a function of ρ2, N1E
and N1L:
p2E = p2M ⇒ N2E = ρ2sβ −N1E (17)
p2L = p2M ⇒ N2L = 2ρ2s− γN1Lα+ γ (18)
Some obvious conditions apply to the size of the different groups. Provided that
banking of travellers is not a real world option, group sizes cannot turn negative. When
ρ2 is smaller than 2ρ1γ/(α+ γ) the subgroup N2L has size zero and hence does not
exist in the equilibrium.
The size of N1M +N2M follows from the size of the other groups. There is however
a degree of freedom left here, which means that we can arbitrarily choose N1M or
N2M . Even could we exempt a group of users of the size N1M +N2M from any charging
scheme without affecting the equilibrium.
In order to determine the optimal level of the charges ρ1 and ρ2, we optimise social
congestion costs. As discussed in the previous section, social congestion costs in the
bottleneck model are equal to the sum of total waiting costs and schedule delay. In
our analysis we will assume that ρ2 > 2ρ1γ/(α+ γ) (or that group N2L has a strictly
positive size). We will evaluate this assumption at the end of this section.
Total waiting and schedule delay costs TC can be expressed as:
TC =C1EN1E +C1MN1M +C1LN1L +C2EN2E +C2MN2M +C2LN2L (19)
Substituting the equilibrium conditions for the group sizes and the generalised costs
allows to establish the conditions to be met for optimality of charge levels:
dTC
dρ1
= 2sερ1− sζρ2− (ε−ζ )Nδ = 0 (20)
and
dTC
dρ2
= sζρ1−2sερ2− εNδ = 0 (21)
with:
• ε = (2α+2γ)/(α+ γ)2 +1/β
• ζ = 4γ/(α+ γ)2 +1/β
Solving (20) and (21) for ρ1 and ρ2 yields:
ρ1 =
ε
2ε+ζ
δ
N
s
(22)
and
ρ2 =
ε+ζ
2ε+ζ
δ
N
s
(23)
Total waiting time and schedule delay are then:
TC =
(
1− ε
2δ
2ε+ζ
)
δ
N2
s
(24)
9
As for the size of the groups we find that:
N1E +N1L = N2E +N2L =
ε2
2ε+ζ
δN (25)
Throughout our analysis we assumed that N2L > 0. This condition can be tested for
using the expressions for optimal charges (22) and (23) to calculate the optimal group
size N2L using expression (18). Under the condition that both α and β are positive, it
can be shown that the optimal group size of N2L is strictly positive as well.
The optimal generic coarse charge presented by Arnott et al. (1990) is a special
case of our differentiated scheme where N2E +N2L = 0. While we do not claim that the
proposed scheme for a differentiated coarse charge (with welfare optimal parameters
values) is optimal with respect to alternative schemes, it is obvious from expression
(25) which implies N2E +N2L > 0 under all circumstances that it does outperform the
generic coarse charge.
Comparing figures 4 and 5, it is obvious the the price paid by travellers in group
2 exceeds the price paid by group 1 by an amount of ρ2−ρ1. Hence the described
equilibrium can only exist if group membership is determined exogenously. In case
group choice must be endogenously, an additional uniform charge of ρ2−ρ1 needs to
be introduced for group 1 to allow for an equilibrium between both groups (but such a
charging scheme violates our definition of a coarse charge).
The two groups coarse charge can be converted in an equally well performing two
groups coarse reward (under the assumption of inelastic demand). The higher reward
then corresponds to a large time slot compared to the lower reward. This seems a very
acceptable proposition in a reward setting where travellers could be attributed randomly
to one of both schemes. Moreover is there an equilibrium between both groups as
they face the same (unrewarded) travel cost for arrivals in the t∗ interval, so the coarse
reward scheme allows for endogenous group choice without further adaptations.
5 Application
In this section we illustrate the case of the proposed differentiated coarse charge by
using generic values of travel time and schedule delay to calculate optimal charge
levels.
Assume a bottleneck capacity s of 500 cars per hour and an inelastic peak demand
N of 1000 cars. Preferred arrival time t∗ is 9 am and value of travel time α is C10 per
hour. Schedule delay early β is valued at C5 per hour, and schedule delay late γ at
C20 per hour.
The no-charge alternative involves travel time and schedule delay costs of C4000
each. Total social congestion costs TC are C8000. A first-best time varying charge
eliminates all waiting and hence overall social costs are equal to schedule delay costs
only. Total social cost TC is then equal to C4000.
The coarse toll as presented by Arnott et al. (1990) would amount to ρ = C4. A
group of 400 travellers would travel before the charge is turned on and 133 after the
charge is turned off. The first traveller departs (and arrives) at 7.27 am and the last
traveller arrives at 9.27 am. The charge is turned on at 8.15 am and turned off at
9.11 am. Total social costs TC are C5869 in this scenario, the corresponding welfare
gain amounts to 53% of the level realised by the first-best charging scheme.
We use the analysis from the previous section to determine optimal implementation
of a two groups differentiated coarse charge. Both groups N1 and N2 have a minimal
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size of N1E +N1L = N2E +N2L = 346 travellers. The remaining 308 peak travellers
can be attributed at either scheme or be exempt from any charge.
The first group N1 faces a charge of ρ1 = C2,59 between 8.30 am and 9.07 am.
The subgroup N1E travelling before the charge is turned on has 260 travellers, of which
the first one departs (and arrives) at 7.59 am. After the charge ends another subgroup
N1L of 86 travellers departs, the last traveller arriving at 9.17 am.
The second group N2 faces a charge of ρ2 = C5,41 between 7.59 am and 9.17 am.
A subgroup N2E of 281 travellers arrives before the charge is levied, with a first traveller
activating the bottleneck at 7.25 am. A last group N2L of 65 travellers passes through
the bottleneck after the charge ends, with the last traveller arriving at 9.25 am.
Total travel time and schedule delay costs in this scenario amount to C5232. The
two groups differentiated coarse charge realises 69% of the first-best welfare gain.
We observe that the generic coarse charge realises about 1/2 of the first best welfare
improvement, which goes up to roughly 2/3 for the two groups coarse charge. This
observation compares to the finding by Laih (1994) that the ratio of efficiency from the
optimal n-step toll to that of the first best toll is n/(n+1) for the case where γ < α .
Looking for real world opportunities to apply a differentiated coarse charge, one
could think of a bottleneck where two highways merge. In such case the inflow rate of
traffic from both motorways in the bottleneck is pretty much stable. An application
would then be to apply a different charging scheme on the two constituting flows of the
bottleneck. A prerequisite is however that no substitution is possible for the individual
traveller.
Another potential application for a differentiated coarse charge is where a conges-
tion charge is levied at motorway access points. Charging schemes could in such a
case be differentiated over access points.
6 Conclusions
There has been much debate on the optimal degree of differentiation to apply in battling
road congestion. Normative economic theory has favoured infinite degrees of differen-
tiation arguing that they correspond to welfare optimal settings. But technological and
cognitive limitations have put a practical limit on the amount of differentiation that can
be handled in real world cases.
In this paper we added to the debate by introducing a way to overcome the cognitive
barrier towards more differentiation: while keeping the cognitive effort for the indi-
vidual traveller constant, the welfare efficiency of a coarse charging scheme increases
by differentiating its parameters across groups of travellers.
We derived analytically the optimal parameter values for a differentiated coarse
charging scheme in the case where we limit to two groups. We illustrated our scheme
using generic shadow cost values and find that differentiating the coarse charge over
two groups increases the relative efficiency to 69% up from 53% for the undifferentiated
coarse charge. This increase is of a magnitude which is comparable to the welfare gain
that is obtained by moving from the coarse charge to a generic two step charge.
The presented charging regime has a considerable degree of flexibility with respect
to implementation. Not only allows the optimal setting for a significant tolerance with
respect to the relative size of the groups attributed to each scheme, also is it possible to
exempt a considerable share of the travellers without facing a negative welfare impact.
Moreover, our analysis makes clear that similar welfare gains can be obtained by non-
price measures, such as number plate policies, that simply ban certain sub-groups from
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travelling during certain intervals. With alternating groups, all users would benefit from
such policies; at least when demand is perfectly inelastic. This robustness leaves plenty
of space to accommodate for practical and political considerations which invariably
come with real world implementations.
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